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The Koon Trap: Why Imperfect
Entrapment Fails to Justify Departure from
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
JOSEPH M. MEADOWS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imperfect entrapment theory postulates that a convicted defendant should spend
less time in prison than a defendant convicted of a similar crime because a
government agent talked the former into committing a crime that he was predisposed
to commit.' Although such a concept appears nowhere in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines ("Guidelines"), 2 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes the theory
as a basis for a judge to depart downward3 from the sentencing range mandated for
such a criminal.4 Citing Ninth Circuit cases as persuasive authority, convicted
defendants in other circuits often allege that the government imperfectly entrapped
them and move the sentencing court to depart downward from the recommended
range in the Guidelines.5 One defendant even challenged the constitutionality of his
conviction based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer
did not move for downward departure based on imperfect entrapment theory.6
Beyond offering a broad description of when it occurs,' courts departing on such
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.S., 1995,
Purdue University; B.S., 1986, United States Military Academy-West Point. I give thanks to
and for my wife, Tracy, whose devotion to our young family inspires me to grow. I wish to
thank my parents for their enthusiastic support of all my endeavors. I would also like to thank
Assistant United States AttomeyTerry Cushing of the Western District of Kentucky for giving
me the opportunity to work on the case that introduced me to this topic and Assistant United
States Attorney Kent Wicker for allowing me to work with him on that case. Lastly, I thank
Professor Craig Bradley and Assistant United States Attorney Cushing for reviewing and
commenting upon earlier drafts of this Note.
1. See United States v. Takai, 941 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1991). Imperfect entrapment
theory is to be distinguished from the full affirmative defense of entrapment, which applies
when government agents induce a non-predisposed subject to commit a crime. See infra text
accompanying notes 43-59.
2. U.S. SENTENciNG GUIDELINES MANUAL (2000) [hereinafter GuIDELINEs].
3. To depart downward or upward from the Guidelines is a term of art referring to the act
of a court passing a sentence that varies from the range dictated in the Guidelines because of
mitigating oraggravating circumstances impacting on the culpability of the defendant. See infra
text accompanying notes 21-36.
4. See, e.g., United States v. McClelland, 72 F.3d 717, 726 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
imperfect entrapment is a legitimate legal basis for downward departure from the prescribed
sentencing range).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v.
Lacey, 86 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1996).
6. Chan v. United States, 182 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision)
(affirming sentence on the grounds that Chan failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel).
7. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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grounds provide government investigators with little guidance as to what conduct
constitutes imperfect entrapment. These courts define no minimum threshold of
government conduct that triggers the defense. In fact, one court departing from the
Guidelines based on the theory specifically absolved the police byreiterating that they
did nothing "unlawful or inappropriate."8 Such contradictory sentencing behavior
could leave investigators bewildered as to how to avoid similar rulings in the future.
This Note directly challenges the merits of imperfect entrapment theory as grounds
for departure from the Guidelines. After establishing the contextual background and
explaining the nature of imperfect entrapment in Part H, Part I of this Note analyzes
imperfect entrapment theory according to Supreme Court entrapment doctrine and
according to the approach to sentencing departures mandated in Koon v. United
States.9 Part I concludes that sentencing courts departing from the Guidelines on the
theory of imperfect entrapment abuse their discretion because they misapply federal
entrapment law and because the theory does not justify departure according to the
Koon analysis. Part IV of this Note calls on the United States Sentencing Commission
("Commission") to amend the Guidelines to state explicitly that courts should not
depart from the Guidelines based on any such theory, and explains why the
Commission is the appropriate authority to take such action.
H. BACKGROUND
The premise of this Note relies heavily upon the very fundamentals of criminal law,
the basic theory of the Guidelines, and a comparison between competing theories of
federal entrapment doctrine in the history of the Supreme Court. The Note uses these
concepts to analyze the validity of imperfect entrapment theory. Accordingly, Subpart
A of this Part reviews the key requirements of criminal prosecution and the nature of
affirmative defenses, describes the underlying theory of the Guidelines, describes
undercover police tactics, and presents the development of federal entrapment
doctrine. Subpart B presents the development of imperfect entrapment and its status
in the law today.
A. Fundamental Theories, Tactics, and Doctrinal Developments
1. The Fundamentals of Criminal Law
The Supreme Court first articulated the fundamental principle ofAmerican criminal
law in In re Winship:0 "[,T]he Due Process Clause [of the United States Constitution]
protects the accused against conviction except upon proofbeyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute a crime with which he is charged."'" The
American judicial system presumes a defendant is innocent unless the prosecution
meets this exacting standard.'2
8. United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 910 (9th Cir. 1993).
9. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
10. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
11. Id. at 364.
12. See MODELPENALCODE § 1.12(l) (Official Draft 1985), reprinted in GEORGE E. Dix
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Regarding substantive criminal liability, the specific elements of the crime and the
requirement that the prosecution prove them beyond a reasonable doubt generally
define who should be subjected to criminal prosecution. 3 In some cases, however,
defendants assert an affirmative defense, 14 such as duress. 15 An affirmative defense
is "not logically and directly related to the elements of the crime charged."' 6 If such
a defendant is persuasive, the jury could acquit him, even though the prosecution
proved every element of the crime under the constitutional standard. 7
If the defendant fails to establish the objective reasonableness of his actions, some
jurisdictions will consider the subjective nature of his predicament as an "imperfect
defense."' 8 Imperfect defenses can reduce the severity of the offense charged. A
defendant in a murder trial, for example, who pleads self-defense but fails to satisfy
the jury that he reasonably believed the victim threatened his life, might have his
murder conviction reduced to manslaughter if he establishes that he truly, but
unreasonably, believed such a threat existed. 9 Alternatively, the sentencing court can
consider the defendant's subjective circumstances when imposing punishment."
Hence, the defendant may get a lighter sentence because the nature of his situation,
as he perceived it, might convince the judge that this particular defendant is not as
culpable as one who committed a similar crime and who acted for more sinister
reasons.
2. The Theory of the Guidelines
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"), 2" federal judges had broad
discretion in sentencing criminals convicted of federal crimes.' The earlier system
lacked "uniformity, predictability, and a degree of detachment.... ."' With the SRA,
Congress attempted to bring consistency to the sentencing process across the federal
judiciary.'
As part of its plan, Congress established the Commission' and charged it with
promulgating sentencing guidelines that "further the basic purposes of criminal
& M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW 57 (4th ed. 1996).
13. DIx& SHARLOT, supra note 12, at 735.
14. See MODELPENALCODE § 1.12(3) (Official Draft 1985), reprinted in DIX & SHARLOT,
supra note 12, at 58.
15. Id. § 2.09, reprinted in Dix & SHARLOT, supra note 12, at 757.
16. DIx & SHARLOT, supra note 12, at 735.
17. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228,234 (1987) (reasoning that "if (reasonable] doubt is not
raised in the jury's mind..., the [crime] will still be excused if the elements of the defense are
satisfactorily established").
18. See Dix & SHARLOT, supra note 12, at 737.
19. Id.
20. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5K2.12.
21. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
22. NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAw 684 (3d ed. 2000).
23. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).
24. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 22, at 684.
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1994).
2002]
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punishment .... ,26 The Guidelines require federal sentencing courts to fit the crime
they seek to punish into an "offense behavior category"'27 and to fit the criminal who
committed the crime into an "offender characteristic category."28 An offense behavior
category takes into account the sort of crime committed, such as whether or not the
defendant used a dangerous weapon, the amount of money stolen, and the quantity
of drugs sold." The offender characteristic category takes into account the guilty
party's prior criminal history.0 From these categories, the sentencing court
determines an offense level and a criminal history category.' The court then
coordinates the offense level and the criminal history category on a chart to determine
an appropriate sentencing range for the class of criminal involved.32
The sentencing court must impose a sentence that is within the specified range
unless the court deems "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the . . .
Commission in formulating the [G]uidelines that should result in a sentence different
from that described."33 Such circumstances authorize the court to depart from the
required sentencing range in the Guidelines. Section 5K of the Guidelines addresses
departures, and the Supreme Court prescribed the manner in which sentencing courts
are to approach them in Koon.34 Generally, before a sentencing court may depart, it
must find that "certain aspects of the case [are] unusual enough for it to fall outside
the heartland of cases in the Guidelines." '3
With the Guidelines' format of restricting a judge's sentencing range but allowing
departures therefrom, the Commission strikes a balance between statutorily imposed
sentences and the traditional discretion afforded the judicial branch. Theoretically,
therefore, two criminals convicted of similar crimes and who have similar criminal
records should get comparable sentences regardless of their respective sentencing
judges, unless one of the criminals faced mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
only a sentencing court is in the position to judge and the Commission in no way
could have anticipated.
3. Undercover Police Tactics
Arguably, one such mitigating or aggravating circumstance is the behavior of
undercover agents of the government. For some crimes, a great amount of police
work is not required to detect when they have been committed. Most bank robberies
are obvious to the tellers and the bank customers unfortunate enough to conduct their
business at the same time the robber decided to do his. Some criminal activities,
26. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, ch. 1, pt. A, 2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § IB 1.1.
32. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n. 1.
33. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5K2.0, policy statement (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(2000)).
34. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95-96 (1996).
35. Id. at 98.
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however, are inherently more difficult to detect than others.36 Drug dealers, corrupt
businessmen, and corrupt public officials, for example, normally .do not engage in
their brand of crime in the presence of uniformed police officers.
To combat these subtle forms of crime, law enforcement personnel sometimes
appear to involve themselves in the very forms of crime they hope to stop.37 When
doing so, they often adopt a fictitious criminal identity,38 and in some cases, afford
actual criminals the opportunity to commit the crime.39 To achieve realism in these
operations, government agents sometimes actually encourage the commission of
crimes.4" Law enforcement personnel often use informants to penetrate and interact
with the criminal community.4 Informants often are actual or former criminals, with
reputations among the criminal community, who cooperate with the government to
gather evidence against fellow criminals, sometimes in return for the prosecutor's
recommendation to the judge for a lighter sentence or some other form of leniency. 2
Problems arise, however, when government agents persuade those who are not prone
to engage in a crime to do so.
4. Competing Theories of Federal Entrapment Doctrine
Defendants arrested for such activity can plead the affirmative defense of
entrapment.43 The term entrapment refers to when "[a] law-enforcement officer or
government agent[] induce[s]... a person to commit a crime... to... bring criminal
prosecution against that person" later." As such, a jury can acquit a defendant who
successfully persuades them that the government entrapped the defendant, even
though the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crime
necessary to convict.45
Entrapment doctrine exists in two forms, each standing on one of two competing
theories. The Model Penal Code and many states adopt the objective theory of
entrapment.' Under this approach, a government agent entraps a defendant if "he
induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting [an] offense
36. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINALPROCEDURE § 5. 1 (a) (2d ed. 1992).
37. JAMES N. GILBERT, CRIMINALINVESTIGATION 371 (Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.
1986) (1980).
38. Id.
39. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 36, § 5.1(a).
40. Id.
41. GILBERT, supra note 37, at 372.
42. Id. at 137.
43. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 59 (1988) (reversing lower court's refusal
to instruct the jury on defense of entrapment because the defendant refused to admit every
element of the crime charged).
44. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (7th ed. 1999).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
46. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 36, § 5.2(b); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13
(Official Draft 1985), reprinted in DIX&SHARLOT, supra note 12, at 821; 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 313 (West 2001) (demonstrating Pennsylvania's adoption of the objective approach to
entrapment); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (2001) (demonstrating Utah's adoption of the
objective approach to entrapment).
2002]
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by... employing methods of persuasion or inducement [that] create a substantial risk
that [the] offense, will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to
commit it."'47 Consistent with the objective theory, the Model Penal Code requires that
the court, in the absence of the jury, acquit a defendant if he proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the government entrapped him4
The objective theory is based on public policy considerations and focuses on the
behavior of the government during the investigation rather than on the culpability of
the defendant." Barring convictions under this approach allows courts to exercise
"supervisory jurisdiction over the administration of criminal justice."' Under the
objective approach, a court may acquit a fully culpable defendant if that defendant
convinced the judge that the government's activities created a substantial risk that
persons other than those ready to commit the crime could have been persuaded or
induced to do so. Apologists for the objective approach believe courts should refuse
to convict entrapped defendants whose guilt has been established because "methods
employed on behalf of the government to bring about conviction 'cannot be
countenanced.'".
The second theory of entrapment, adopted by the Supreme Court and a majority of
the states, is known as the "subjective approach."52 The subjective approach asks the
jury to focus on the behavior and disposition of the person charged with the crime. 3
The jury's subjective approach analysis consists of a two-part inquiry. The first
inquiry examines whether a government agent induced the defendant to commit the
offense conduct.' The second inquiry asks whether the defendant was predisposed
to commit the sort of crime charged.55 If the jury decides that a defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime when the opportunity afforded itself, whether or not
the government's conduct might have persuaded a person not ready to commit the
crime does not matter, the defense of entrapment is not available to that defendant. 6
Critics charge that this approach does nothing to discourage unscrupulous tactics on
the part of investigators trying to make arrests.5 7 Proponents of this approach,
however, argue that the defendant predisposed to commit the crime is the very person
47. MODELPENALCODE § 2.13 (Official Draft 1985), reprinted in DIx& SHARLOT, supra
note 12, at 821.
48. Id.
49. See LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 36, § 5.2(b).
50. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,381 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
51. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 36, § 5.2(b) (quoting Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380).
52. Id. § 5.2(a).
53. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(summarizing the "'subjective' approach to the defense of entrapment").
54. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373 (allowing that, under allegations of entrapment, "at trial
the accused may examine the conduct of the government agent").
55. See id. (continuing that "on the other hand, the accused will be subjected to an
'appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predispositions' as bearing on his
claim of innocence" (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932))).
56. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490 (holding that "predisposition rendered [an entrapment]
defense unavailable to [the defendant]").
57. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 36, § 5.2(c).
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for whom authorities wrote the law criminalizing the behavior"8 and the very person
for whomlaw enforcement officials designed the undercover investigation to catch. 9
B. Imperfect Entrapment
Prior to the SRA, a federal sentencingjudge sympathetic to the objective approach
to entrapment, uncomfortable with particular police conduct, but who recognized the
predisposition' ° of the defendant could find solace in traditional sentencing discretion
by giving the defendant a punishment the judge considered just.6 Today, however,
the SRA would restrict a judge in this situation. The Guidelines would require the
judge to sentence the defendant according to the applicable offense behavior category
and offender characteristic category, without considering the behavior ofgovernment
agents.62 Notwithstanding, some sentencing courts depart from the Guidelines
because of alleged police misconduct on the theory of "imperfect" entrapment.' This
Subpart examines imperfect entrapment theory, first, by presenting the historical
development of the theory. This Subpart then presents the status of imperfect
entrapment theory as it exists today.
1. The Development of Imperfect Entrapment Theory
United States v. Giles'4 is an early case in which entrapment-like conduct did not
amount to a complete defense but provided partial grounds for departure from the
Guidelines. Giles was a British businessman convicted of money laundering.6" He
flew from England to New York to accept $100,000 cash from an acquaintance, a
government informant, to take back to Europe and invest.' The informant and an FBI
undercover agent told Giles that the money came from the sale of cocaine, and the
three discussed ways of getting the money out of the country.6' Giles ultimately
58. See id. § 5.2(c).
59. See id. § 5.2(d).
60. If the evidence was insufficient to support the predisposition of the defendant, such a
judge could find for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra
note 36, § 25.3(a), (e).
61. See ABRAMS &BEALE, supra note 22, at 684.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 27-35.
63. This Note distinguishes the theory of imperfect entrapment, as developed primarily in
the Ninth Circuit, from the theory of sentencing entrapment, in which a government agent
intentionally increases the amount of illegal substance a defendant purchases or possesses,
whether or not the defendant knew of the increase, for the sole purpose of increasing the
potential sentence. Arguably, section 2D 1.1, Application Note 15 of the Guidelines addresses
the issue of sentencing entrapment and focuses on the subjective culpability of the defendant
in a manner consistentwith the theory of the.Guidelines. On the other hand, one can argue that
section 2DI.1, Application Note 15 only authorizes a court to correct a sentencing factor
artificially enhanced by the police. See infra text accompanying notes 177-79.
64. 768 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
65. Id. at 102.
66. Id.
67. Id.
20021
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agreed to take the money in a briefcase on his return flight." Authorities arrested
Giles when he arrived at the airport.69
Giles asserted in his defense that he was entrapped and that the government
engaged in outrageous conduct because it exploited the informant's knowledge of
Giles's severe financial circumstances."0 He also claimed that he never intended to
take the money on the plane, but "was merely waiting until he got into the airport
where he would be able to turn the money over to Customs Officers and explain the
situation."' A jury rejected these defenses and convicted Giles.72 The sentencing
court departed downward from the Guidelines after considering Giles's lack of a
criminal history of money laundering, his personal financial difficulties, and the fact
that the govemmentpermitted an informant "to use his prior personal relationship and
knowledge of Giles' difficulties to involve a previously innocent individual in a
criminal scheme. ' 'n The court considered these circumstances to be "mitigating
factors 'not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the [G]uidelines."' 74
One year prior to Giles, the Eighth Circuit decided United States v. Streeter.' In
Streeter, the defendant asserted district court error for not considering governmental
misconduct as a mitigating factor warranting downward departure.76 The defendant
argued that the informant in the case "us[ed] sex to induce him to sell [the informant]
drugs and badger[ed] others to sell drugs after they had initially refused to do so."'
The court held this conduct did not bar a conviction and that governmental or
prosecutorial misconduct should not "mitigate the sentence of an admittedly guilty
defendant."'78
In United States v. Dickey,79 a defendant in the Ninth Circuit made a similar
argument to the one made in Streeter. Convicted under a guilty plea, the defendant
asserted that the district court abused its discretion by not departing downward from
the sentencing guidelines because a "government informant 'talked him into' printing
... counterfeit money.""0 The Dickey majority agreed with the Streeter court and held
that "no warrant [exists] for the argument that governmental... misconduct should
mitigate the sentence of an admittedly guilty defendant."'" In a separate opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Reinhardt disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that "such a defense, as a matter of law, can never serve as a
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 103.
74. Id. at 104 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)).
75. 907 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1990), overruled inpart by United States v. Richmond, 37 F.3d
418 (8th Cir. 1994).
76. Id. at 786.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 787.
79. 924 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1991).
80. Id. at 839.
81. Id. (citing Streeter, 907 F.2d at 787).
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basis for a downward departure. ' In his view, "the defense of imperfect entrapment
is a 'mitigating circumstance of a kind.,, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. "'I Judge Reinhardt stated
that the defendant in the case at hand may not necessarily have been imperfectly
entrapped. 4 However, he insisted that "[n]o policy or provision of the Guidelines
justifies the majority's decision to foreclose completely the possibility that imperfect
entrapment may on occasion justify a downward departure." 5
Judge Reinhardt's dissent provided footing for lower courts in the Ninth Circuit to
depart from the Guidelines when defendants allege questionable government conduct.
In United States v. Takai,86 the defendants pled guilty to bribery and conspiracy to
bribe an official of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.' In affirming the
lower court's downward departure, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished
Dickey, in part, because "the person who solicited the acts was a government official
whom the defendants had every reason to believe was aware of the law; he was not
an undercover agent or other informant whose government status was not visible to
the defendants."88 In addition to other factors,"9 the court justified departure on
"evidence at the sentencinghearing that [the government agent's] conduct influenced
the defendants' decision to continue playing a pivotal role," even though there was
no allegation of entrapment at trial.
In United States v. Garza-Juarez,9 a jury convicted the defendants of selling
firearms and possession of unregistered suppressors (devices that reduce the noise
associated with gunfire). 2 In that case, govemmentundercoverinvestigators initiated
contact with one of the defendants at a "swap meet" afterreports that illegal sales had
occurred there.93 The investigators had no indication that this particular defendant
took part in any illegal activities.94 However, they approached this defendant because
he had "[ten] to [fifteen] firearms, including assault weapons, displayed for sale."95
This defendant claimed that he was selling his personal collection because he needed
the money.' The agent, however, "concluded that there were many factors showing
that [the defendant] was selling other than a personal collection."97 The investigators
engaged in several communications with the defendants over a four month period,
82. Id. at 840.
83. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) (omission in original)).
84. Id. at 841.
85. Id.
86. 941 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1991).
87. Id. at 740.
88. Id. at 744.
89. See id. at 741. The other factors included "the defendants' attempt to play a more
limited roleD and the absence of pecuniary gain by defendants." Id.
90. Id.
91. 992 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1993).
92. Id. at 899.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. 'at 900.
96. Id.
97. Id.
2002]
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asking the defendants if they could make some modifications to the guns and
suppressors or sell the items without "paperwork.""8 After illegally delivering some
suppressors to the agents, the defendants were arrested. A search revealed that they
also possessed unregistered firearms at the time." The sentencing court based a
downward departure for one of the defendants partially on amedical condition."° The
court justified both defendants' downward departures because "the conduct of this
investigation, although not amounting to entrapment, was sufficiently coercive in
nature as to warrant a downward departure under Guideline 5K2.12."''
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence."° Citing Takai and Judge
Reinhardt's dissent in Dickey, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had the
authority to depart based on governmental conduct, "even though the agent's conduct
'did not constitute entrapment in a legal sense.""' 3 The court also found that neither
the district court's factual findings were erroneous nor that the extent of the departure
was unreasonable,' even though the district court explicitly noted that the agents did
nothing "unlawful or inappropriate:"' 5
The dissenting view in Dickey, holding that imperfect entrapment could serve as
an independent grounds for departure, finallyprevailed inthe Ninth Circuit in United
States v. McClelland.'0 6 In McClelland, Judge Reinhardt, writing for the majority,
affirmed a downward departure based solely on imperfect entrapment. 7 A jury
convicted the defendant, McClelland, of using interstate commerce facilities to
commit murder-for-hire.' In February 1994, McClelland had contacted another
individual, Russell, about killing his estranged wife."° The two discussed various
plans for the scheme and agreed on aprice of $ 10,000.'"' On March 13, 1994, Russell
contacted the FBI and told them of the conversations he had been having with
McClelland."' Russell accepted a tape recorder from the FBI and agreed to verify the
murder plot with tape recordings."' On March 24, Russell and McClelland again
discussed numerous ways to execute their plan."' At some points during that
conversation, McClelland showed signs of reluctance to follow through with the
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 902 (citing GUIDELINES, supra note 2, §§ 5H 1.3, 5K2.0 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(1988) as grounds for departure for medical conditions "of a kind not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating its guidelines").
10 1. Id. (internal quotation omitted). Section 5K2.12 of the Guidelines allows for departure
based on coercion or duress not amounting to a complete defense. See infra text accompanying
note 162.
102. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d at 899.
103. Id. at 912 (quoting United States v. Takai, 941 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1991)).
104. Id. at 913.
105. Id. at 910.
106. 72 F.3d 717 (9th Cir. 1995).
107. Id. at 719.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 719-20.
113. Id. at 720.
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plan."14 Though the jury rejected an entrapment defense and convicted the
defendant," 5 the district court found sufficient evidence of inducement to justify a
downward departure based on imperfectentrapmentbecause a government informant
allegedly "prod[ded] and encourage[d]" the defendant." 6
2. The Status of Imperfect Entrapment Theory Today
The circuits are split over the validity of the theory of imperfect entrapment as
grounds justifying departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. As demonstrated in
McClelland,"7 the Ninth Circuit fully embraces the theory. It, however, is the only
circuit to have clearly done so. The Second Circuit affirmed the downward departure
in Giles."' However, that sentencing court based the sentence on the highly unusual
circumstances of the case and not explicitly on a formal theory of imperfect
entrapment." 9 Some claim that Giles represents the Second Circuit's recognition of
the theory ofimperfect entrapment,2 butrecent case law from that circuit casts doubt
on this assertion.' 2 ' The Eighth Circuit has never affirmed a sentencing departure
grounded on the theory. Hence, that circuit's only implication of its imperfect
entrapment doctrine is the holding in Streeter." The Eleventh Circuit clearly has
rejected the notion as grounds for departure. In United States v. Miller," the
Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court's departure based on "partial entrapment." 24
No circuit other than the Ninth has affirmed a departure based on imperfect
entrapment; yet no circuit other than the Eleventh has so explicitly rejected it.
In Koon v. United States,"2 the Supreme Court addressed the federal judiciary's
general approach to departures from the Guidelines. Koon specifically articulated
"that a federal court's examination of whether a factor can ever be an appropriate
114. Id.
115. Id. at 722-23.
116. Id. at 726 n.6.
117. Id. at 719; see also supra text accompanying notes 106-14.
118. United States v. Giles, 953 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision).
119. United States v. Giles, 768 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
120. See, e.g., Suzanne Mitchell, Clarifyingthe UnitedStatesSentencingGuidelines'Focus
Qn Government Conduct in Reverse Sting Sentencing: Imperfect Entrapment as a Logical
Incomplete Defense that Warrants Departure, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 746, 767 (1996).
121. United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that the Second Circuit
has not yet decided if imperfect entrapment is proscribed by the Guidelines as grounds for
departure).
122. 907 F.2d 781, 787 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that governmental or prosecutorial
misconduct should not "mitigate the sentence of an admittedly guilty defendant"); see also
supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
123. 71 F.3d 813 (11 th Cir. 1996).
124. Id. at 818. Though it is debatable whether or not the issue in Miller was imperfect
entrapment as envisioned by the Ninth Circuit or sentencing entrapment, in which the
government agent substitutes the planned type or amount of controlled substance to enhance
the sentence, the Eleventh Circuit's strong language denouncing any theory of entrapment less
than a complete defense makes it seem likely that it would reverse any departure based on the
Ninth Circuit concept of imperfect entrapment as well.
125. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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basis for departure is limited to determining whether the Commission has proscribed,
as a categorical matter, consideration of the factor."'" If not, "the... court must
determine whether the factor,... in the particular circumstances, takes the case
outside of the heartland of the applicable Guideline."' 27 This holding might indicate
that circuit court denunciations of entire theories for departure, such as the holding
in Miller, are not consistent with Koon. However, nothing in Koon seems to prevent
a circuit court from consistently reversing departures based on imperfect entrapment
as abuses of discretion. In fact, the Guidelines suggest that the Commission expects
courts of appeals "to find departures 'unreasonable' where they fall outside suggested
levels."'2
m. ANALYSIS
Koon's holding that a court cannot refuse to consider any factor categorically as
grounds for departure might seem to indicate that, because the Commission did not
specifically preclude imperfect entrapment, the theory is worthy of consideration.
However, no theory could justify departure if, under any circumstances, such a
departure would constitute an abuse of discretion. In this Part, this Note argues that,
in any circumstances, downward departure from the Guidelines based solely on the
theory of imperfect entrapment constitutes abuse of discretion by the sentencing court
because the theory is contrary to Supreme Court entrapment doctrine and because it
fails the Koon analysis of the sufficiency of grounds for departure. Supporting this
conclusion, Subpart A analyzes imperfect entrapment according to federal entrapment
doctrine, and Subpart B applies the departure analysis set forth by the Supreme Court
in Koon.
A. Imperfect Entrapment Theory Violates Federal Entrapment Doctrine
1. Argument Asserting Abuse of Discretion
By departing downward from the Guidelines based solely on imperfect entrapment
theory, a sentencing court abuses its discretion because it misapplies federal
entrapment doctrine. It misapplies federal entrapment doctrine because it examines
entrapment allegations using the objective theory rather than the subjective theory.
The Supreme Court adopts the subjective approach to entrapment defenses' 9 ana
consistently requires that the jury decide such questions according to the culpability
of the defendant.'30 In Sorrells v. United States," Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the
Court:
126. Id. at 109.
127. Id.
128. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, ch. 1, pt. A, § 4(b).
129. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 36, § 5.2 (a).
130. Id. § 5.3(b).
131. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
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It is well settled that the fact that officers or employees of the [g]overnment merely
afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not defeat
the prosecution.... A different question is presented when the criminal design
originates with the officials of the [g]overnment, and they implant in the mind of
an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its
commission in order that they may prosecute.'32
In United States v. Russell,' the Court asserted that predisposition is "the principal
element in the defense of entrapment."' 34 Consistent with the subjective approach, the
Court held in Sherman v. United States' that the question of entrapment "is for the
jury as part of its function of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused."' 36
Courts departing from the Guidelines on imperfect entrapment theory adopt the
objective perspective of entrapment because imperfect entrapment theory focuses on
the behavior of law enforcement officials during undercover investigations. By the
theory's very definition,' sentencing courts departing on imperfect entrapment
grounds take remedial action according to the actions of the police, whether or not the
defendant was predisposed. This inquiry and the resulting departure directly affront
the holding in Russell that activities of government agents that do not "implant the
criminal design in the mind of the defendanf' do not defeat a prosecution.' As a
posttrial sentencing issue, allegations of imperfect entrapment become factual issues
for the court to decide,39 encroaching upon a question left solely to the jury by the
Sherman Court. 40 Hence, by focusing the inquiry on governmental conduct and
sentencing accordingly, regardless of the defendant's predisposition, sentencing
courts departing from the Guidelines on imperfect entrapment theory adopt the
objective approach to allegations of entrapment. This approach directly violates the
Supreme Court's federal entrapment doctrine.
2. Examples of Misapplications of Federal Entrapment Law
Cases departing downwardbased on imperfect entrapment provide clear examples
of misapplications of federal entrapment doctrine. In Giles, the sentencing court
focused on the government conduct, rather than the culpability of the defendant,
when it referred to the "vice" in permitting the informant to use his past personal
relationship and his knowledge of the defendant's difficulties.14' The Giles court
departed downward on these grounds in spite of its own admission that "[t]he jury's
verdict convicting Giles despite his entrapment defense reflects a finding that Giles
132. Id. at 441-42.
133. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
134. Id. at 433.
135. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
136. Id. at 377.
137. See supra text accompanying note 1.
138. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436.
139. See supra Part II.B.1.
140. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 377.
141. United States v. Giles, 768 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 953 F.2d 636 (2d
Cir. 1991).
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was predisposed to commit the crime..., thus entrapment cannot be used to justify
departure in the sentencing."' 42 In McClelland, the appellate court cited "abundant
evidence that.. . an agent of the government.., induced [the defendant] to commit
a crime" 14 1 in spite of the jury having found him "already predisposed to commit the
crime."'"' Seemingly, only the adoption ofthe objective approach to entrapment could
explain these courts' emphasis on governmental conduct rather than leaving
entrapment issues "for the jury as part of its function of determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.' '
45
3. Possible Counterarguments
The Russell Court conceded in dicta that, in some situations, "the conduct of law
enforcement agents [may be] so outrageous [as to violate due process principles].'""
Accordingly, one might argue that departures based on imperfect entrapment theory
are consistent with the Supreme Court's due process concerns. However, these
concerns arise when that government conduct violates "fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of justice."'47 Supreme Court doctrine consistently
views such circumstances as barring conviction. 4' Thus, if the circumstances were
so shocking as to violate constitutional standards, the defendant should be acquitted
and not face sentencing at all. If the circumstances were not so fundamentally unfair
as to trigger constitutional due process protections, Supreme Court entrapment
doctrine requires the federal courts to apply the subjective approach, focusing on the
culpability of the defendant.
Another argument that imperfect entrapment departures are consistent with
Supreme Court entrapment doctrine might be that such departures are a reasonable
exercise of the court's supervisory power over police conduct. However, in Hampton
v. United States,"49 the Court noted that "[t]he execution of the federal laws under our
Constitution is confided primarily to the Executive Branch..., subject to applicable
constitutional and statutory limitations and to judicially fashioned rules to enforce
those limitations."'5 0 Even Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Hampton pointed
out that a court "should be extremely reluctant to invoke the supervisory power. ' ' 5
Once again, therefore, if the governmental conduct did not trigger "judicially
fashioned rules" to invoke "the applicable constitutional... limitations" so as to
justify dropping the indictment, Supreme Court entrapment doctrine requires the
sentencing court to focus on the subjective culpability of the defendant according to
142. Id.
143. United States v. McClelland, 72 F.3d 717,726 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995).
144. Id. at 725.
145. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 377.
146. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
147. Id. at 432 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246
(1960)).
148. Id. at 431-32.
149. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
150. Id. at 490 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1976)).
151. Id. at 494 (Powell, J., concurring).
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the Guidelines.
To summarize, Supreme Court rulings on issues of federal law bind lower federal
courts.' Accordingly, lower federal courts must follow the Supreme Court's
subjective approach to entrapment. Because imperfect entrapment incorporates the
objective theory, sentencing courts departing on those grounds fail to adhere to
federal entrapment doctrine and abuse their discretion in so doing.
B. Applying Koon to Imperfect Entrapment
Besides failing to follow Supreme Court entrapment doctrine, courts departing
from the Guidelines based on imperfect entrapment theory abuse their discretion by
failing to adhere to the full requirements of the analysis mandated in Koon v. United
States.1
54
Koon held that a sentencing court cannot use as a basis for departure any factor that
is forbidden by the Guidelines.' Some factors are encouraged by the Commission
as bases to depart, and the sentencing court is authorized to do so as long as the factor
is not taken into account and applied to the case on grounds elsewhere in the
Guidelines. 6 If the factor is taken into account elsewhere in the Guidelines, or if the
factor is a forbidden factor, the sentencing court should depart from the Guidelines
"only if the factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some other way makes the
case different from the ordinary case where the factor is present."' Finally, if the
Guidelines do not mention a particular factor, the Supreme Court directs sentencing
courts to decide whether the factor suffices to take the case out of the "heartland" of
the Guidelines "after considering the 'structure and theory of both relevant individual
guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole.""" Courts wishing to depart from
the Guidelines based on imperfect entrapment must apply this last test because the
Guidelines make no mention of police conduct that inappropriately induces criminal
behavior.
1. Consideration of Relevant Individual Guidelines
Imperfect entrapment theory is insufficient tojustify departure fromthe Guidelines
after considering the structure and theory of section 5K2.12,' the guideline relevant
to this inquiry."'6 Indeed, courts departing from the Guidelines based on imperfect
152. Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
153. See Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867, 870 (8th Cir. 2001).
154. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
155. Id. at 95-96.
156. Id. at 96.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (Ist Cir. 1993)).
159. GUIDELINS, supra note 2, § 5K2.12.
160. At first inspection, it would seemthat section 5K2.0 is a relevant individual guideline.
However, this guideline consists of a policy statement regarding departures in general. Thus,
this Note addresses the applicability of section 5K2.0 when examining the structure and theory
of the Guidelines as a whole.
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entrapment often cite section 5K2.12, which addresses imperfect defenses and
reads as follows:
Coercion and Duress (Policy Statement)
If the defendant committed the offense because of serious coercion, blackmail or
duress, under circumstances not amounting to a complete defense, the court may
decrease the sentence below the applicable guideline range. The extent of the
decrease ordinarily should depend on the reasonableness of the defendant's
actions and on the extent to which the conduct would have been less harmful
under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Ordinarily coercion
will be sufficiently serious to warrant departure only when it involves a threat of
physical injury, substantial damage to property or similar injuryresulting from the
unlawful action of a third party or from a natural emergency. The Commission
considered the relevance of economic hardship and determined that personal
financial difficulties and economic pressures upon a trade or business do not
warrant a decrease in the sentence.'
This language explicitly indicates that the Commission intends that a sentencing
court focus on the defendant's subjective frame of mind. The second sentence
specifically directs courts to consider "the reasonableness of the defendant's actions
and ... the extent to which the conduct would have been less harmful under the
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be."''  Looking at any imperfect
entrapment case from this perspective demands the conclusion that imperfect
entrapment, as an independent theory, is not'sufficient to justify departure.
All defendants pleading imperfect entrapment, by definition, are doing so because
the actual circumstances under which they were arrested were less harmful than they
believed them to be. Such defendants did not know that they were dealing with
government informants. They thought their cohorts were like-minded criminals
willing to perpetrate crimes. Had the circumstances been as the defendant believed
them to be in McClelland, the hired assassin would have attempted to kill the
defendant's estranged wife.'" In Giles, the defendant would have laundered $100,000
worth of illegal cocaine sale proceeds. 5 In Garza-Juarez, the defendants would have
been successful at selling illegal weapons."s The conduct of these defendants would
have been just as harmful, and arguably more harmful, had the circumstances been
as they perceived them. Thus, departing on the grounds of imperfect entrapment is
an abuse of discretion according to the structure and theory of section 5K2.12.
One might argue that, in cases justifying departure on section 5K2.12, the
sentencing courts focused on the coercive aspects of the governmental conduct
combined with the notion that the Commission invites courts to consider factors
161. E.g., United States v. McClelland, 72 F.3d 717, 725 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 910 (9th Cir. 1993).
162. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5K2.12.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 106-16.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 64-74.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 91-105.
[Vol. 77:341
THE KOON TRAP
relating to these grounds because the Commission did not consider them
adequately."6 However, this argument lacks logical support. The departing courts
themselves cite the governmental conduct as their bases, " and one would have a
difficult time justifying these departures solely on grounds of coercion or duress had
the catalysts been fellow criminals rather than government informants. Had the
coercion or duress been such to justify departure independently, the departing courts
could rely solely on the language of section 5K2.12 and would not need to make any
reference to the fact that the defendants dealt with government informants. No one
could argue reasonably that a departure would not be justified had a government
informant led a defendant to believe that his life was in danger or that he faced
serious bodily injury. But if such a situation ever went to trial and resulted in a
conviction, it would fit well within the language of section 5K2.12, and imperfect
entrapment theory would be unnecessary. Thus, arguments that these courts focused
on the defendants' culpability rather than the conduct of the government agents fail
as a matter of logic.
In summary, the structure and theory of section 5K2.12 requires sentencing courts
to focus on the subjective situation in which the convicted defendant found himself.
Imperfect entrapment theory focuses on governmental conduct. Thus, downward
departure based on imperfect entrapment is insufficient grounds for departure when
considering the structure and theory of section 5K2.12.
3. Consideration of the Guidelines Taken as a Whole
The second part of the Koon analysis of the sufficiency of grounds for departure
not mentioned in the Guidelines considers the structure and theory of the Guidelines
as a whole. "9 Under this examination, imperfect entrapment theory is insufficient to
justify departure from the Guidelines because the theory cannot be reconciled with
the "policy statements[] and official commentary of the... Commission" regarding
departures.'
a. Conflicts with Guidelines' Policy
Statements About Departures
Imperfect entrapment theory departures cannot be reconciled with the general
policy statements about departures in the Guidelines. The Guidelines address the
general approach to departures in section 5K2.0 and Chapter 1, Part A, section 4(b).
Section 5K2.0 explains the impossibility of having a specific guideline for every
possible factual scenario a sentencing court might face. To remedy this situation, this
guideline authorizes a sentencing court to
impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable guidelinesf if
the court finds 'that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
167. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5K2.0.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 73, 101, 116.
169. Koon, 518 U.S. at 106.
170. Id.
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kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the . . .
Commission in formulating the [G]uidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described."
7
'
Chapter 1, Part A, section 4(b) offers enlightenment to sentencing courts trying to
decide if their factual situations justify a departure. This portion of the Guidelines
reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Where the guidelines do not specify an augmentation or diminution, this is
generally because the sentencing data did not permit the Commission to conclude
that the factor was empirically important in relation to the particular offense. Of
course, an important factor (e.g., physical injury) may infrequently occur in
connection with a particular crime (e.g., fraud). Such rare occurrences are
precisely the type of events that the courts' departure powers were designed to
cover-unusual cases outside the range of the more typical offenses for which the
guidelines were designed."7
Considering the Guidelines as a whole, the approach to departures set forth by the
Commission in these excerpts would seem to exclude departures based on imperfect
entrapment. If one argues that behavior of undercover agents and the conduct of sting
operations in general is a factor "not adequately taken into consideration by the...
Commission,"'73 one must consider whether the Commission came to the conclusion
that this factor was not "empirically important in relation to the particular offense."' 74
Sting operations in modem criminal law enforcement are quite common, particularly
in relation to drug offenses. 7 " It is highly unlikely that the Commission considered
the effects of sting operations on the culpability of defendants as rare a factor as
physical injury during the perpetration of fraud. It is equally unlikely that the
Commission did not consider the potential effects of stings on a defendant's
culpability. However, to justify an imperfect entrapment departure based on section
5K2.0 while taking the theory and structure of the Guidelines as a whole, a
sentencing court would have to reach at least one of these erroneous conclusions.
There is evidence in the Guidelines that the Commission did consider the effects
of sting operations on the culpability of defendants. The Commission specifically
addressed aspects of sting operations it considered to impact the culpability of a
defendant in section 2D 1. 1.7 Application Note 15 of this guideline states:
in a reverse sting (an operation in which a government agent sells or negotiates to
sell a controlled substance to a defendant),.. . the government agent set a price
... that was substantially below the market value..., thereby leading to the
defendant's purchase of a significantly greater quantity. .. than, his available
171. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5K2.0.
172. Id. at ch. 1, pt. A, § 4(b) (emphasis added).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 33, 83, 167.
174. See supra text accompanying note 172.
175. RICHARD H. WARD, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMNAL INVESTIGATION 205 (1975).
176. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 2D1.1.
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resources would have allowed him.., except for the artificially low price set by
the government agent .... 17
From this guideline, it is apparent that the Commission considered the effect of sting
operations on the culpability of the defendant.
One commentator argues that section 2D1.1, Application Note 15 "suggests that
a court may focus on the conduct of the government actors in an imperfect
entrapment setting."""' However, section 2Dl.1, Application Note 15 alone seems
only to authorize a court to correct a sentencing factor artificially enhanced by the
police. It does not seem to say anything regarding the inducement of the crime itself.
Furthermore, taking the Guidelines as a whole requires interpreting section 2Dl.1,
Application Note 15 in conjunction with section 5K2.0 and Chapter 1, Part A, section
4(b). Application Note 15 of section 2D 1.1 indicates that the Commission considered
the impact of sting operations on the culpability of defendants. This removes the
possibility that the Commission did not consider imperfect entrapment factors
empirically important in relation to the particular offense, thus barring the
authorization for departure on those grounds under section 5K2.0. Therefore, the
theory of imperfect entrapment cannot be reconciled with the general policy
statements about departures in the Guidelines.
b. Conflicts with Policy Statements About
Objectives of Guidelines
Imperfect entrapment theory is insufficient to justify departure from the Guidelines
after considering the structure and theory of the Guidelines as a whole because it
conflicts directly with Congress's second objective in enacting the SRA, as described
in the general policy statements concerning the Guidelines' basic approach.'79 This
objective focuses on the culpability of similar offenders committing similar crimes
and aims to impose on these criminals relatively equal sentences. Under imperfect
entrapment theory, however, similar criminals committing similar crimes would be
sentenced equally unless one of the defendants dealt with a government informant.
In that case, that particular defendant might geta lighter sentence.' Hence, imperfect
177. Id. at cmt. n.15.
178. Mitchell, supra note 120, at 766.
179. GUIDEUNES, supra note 2, ch. 1, pt. A, § 3. The Guidelines explain that Congress
sought three objectives when it enacted the SRA. The first objective was "to enhance the ability
of the criminal justice system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system."
Id. The second objective was to seek "reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing wide
disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders."
Id. Congress's third objective was to achieve "proportionality in sentencing through a system
that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity." Id.
180. This author concedes that federal entrapment doctrine creates a similar dichotomy, that
is, a non-predisposed defendant whom a codefendant induced to commit a crime will likely be
convicted while a similarly non-predisposed defendant induced by a government agent to
commit a crime will likely be acquitted. However, this Note addresses the proper application
of the Guidelines after conviction and after the defendant either failed to present, or the jury
rejected, an entrapment defense. This Note does not attempt to explain orjustify the policies
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entrapment, as justification for downward departure from the Guidelines, hinders
Congress's objective of giving similar sentences to similar criminals for similar
crimes.
As this analysis demonstrates, under the structure and theory of the Guidelines
taken as a whole, the theory of imperfect entrapment fails the second inquiry of the
Koon analysis for the sufficiency of grounds for departure from the Guidelines-the
theory cannot be reconciled with the generalpolicy statements about departures in the
Guidelines and it conflicts with one of Congress's objectives in enacting the SRA.
As earlier analyses show, courts that depart from the Guidelines based on the theory
of imperfect entrapment ignore Supreme Court entrapment doctrine and either ignore
the Koon analysis for departures or fail to conduct it thoroughly. Either way,
sentencing courts that depart downward from the Guidelines based on the theory of
imperfect entrapment abuse their discretion.
IV. RECOMMENDED REMEDY
Having concluded that departing from the Guidelines under imperfect entrapment
theory constitutes abuse of discretion, this Note now urges the Commission to remedy
the situation. In so doing, Subpart A of this Part presents the appropriate measure the
Commission should take to resolve inconsistent treatment of imperfect entrapment
allegations in federal court. Subpart B explains why the Commission is the sole body
with the authority to act. Finally, Subpart C discusses why such action is necessary.
A. The Appropriate Action
The Commission should amend the Guidelines to state clearly that, when
sentencing a convicted defendant, courts should not consider actions on the part of
government agents beyond the activities specified in section 2D 1.1, Application Note
15 or beyond any behavior that fits into the language of section 5K2.12. Currently,
only one circuit has affirmed departure based on the theory of imperfect
entrapment.' However, because of its success in the Ninth Circuit, defendants in
other circuits plead imperfect entrapment, or some variation thereof, and use these
Ninth Circuit cases as persuasive authority. 182 The theory seems to attract the
attention of defendants because there is virtually no minimum threshold of
governmental conduct that qualifies. Thus, as long as a government agent was
involved inthe investigation, allegations of inducement mightpersuade a sympathetic
judge at sentencing. Amending the Guidelines as recommended would remedy this
situation.
behind the subjective and objective theories of entrapment or their relative fairness or
unfairness.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 86-116.
182. See, e.g., United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v.
Lacey, 86 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1996).
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B. The Sentencing Commission Has Sole Responsibility
The Commission should amend the Guidelines because it is solely responsible for
the Guidelines' development. The SRA makes the Commission responsible for
reviewing and rationalizing the federal sentencing system8 3 under an "evolutionary
process."'M The Koon Court held that a "court's examination of whether a factor can
ever be an appropriate basis for departure is limited to determining whether the
Commission has proscribed, as a categorical matter, consideration of the factor."'"
Hence, federal appellate courts cannot declare a factor, categorically, as an
inappropriate basis for departure. The appellate courts can only review a district
court's departure for abuse of discretion. 8 ' The Commission, therefore, is the only
authority capable of reducing the disparity in sentencing that results from imperfect
entrapment departures.
C. Why Action Is Necessary
The Commission should amend the Guidelines as recommended to resolve a split
between the Ninth and the Eleventh Circuits. McClelland demonstrates that the Ninth
Circuit fully recognizes imperfect entrapment as grounds for departure."8 7 In
McClelland, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a departure based solely on the grounds of
imperfect entrapment involving allegations of government inducement. Meanwhile,
in United States v. Miller,' the Eleventh Circuit indicated that the theory might
consistently be deemed insufficient to justify departure. In Miller, the Eleventh
Circuit rejected notions of partial entrapment as justification for departure and
declined the invitation to "implicitly undermine the verdict returned by the jury."'89
Though the actual defendants in McClelland and Miller were not similar criminals
convicted of similar crimes, this comparison indicates the possibility that the Ninth
Circuit might affirm a downward departure based on imperfect entrapment in a case
with a defendant similar in all aspects of criminality to a defendant in the Eleventh
Circuit for whom the court would likely reverse such a departure. Because of this
potential sentencing disparity, the Commission should amend the Guidelines as
recommended and restore uniformity to the federal sentencing process.
Summarizing this Part, the Commission should amend the Guidelines to prohibit
courts from considering government conductbeyond the activities specified in section
2D1.1, Application Note 15 or any behavior that fits into the language of section
5K2.12 because a split exists between the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits on the theory
of imperfect entrapment and the Commission has the sole authority to resolve this
split. To amend the Guidelines as recommended would not seem to be a radical step
for the Commission. As demonstrated earlier, departures based on imperfect
183. GuIDELNES, supra note 2, ch. 1, pt. A, § 2.
184. Id. § 3.
185. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 109 (1996).
186. Id. at 97.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 105-14.
188. 71 F.3d 813 (11th Cir. 1996).
189. Id. at 818 (citing United States v. Costales, 5 F.3d 480,487 (1 th Cir. 1993)).
2002]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
entrapment theory constitute abuse of discretion because they fail to provide
sufficient grounds after considering the structure and theory of the individual relevant
guidelines and the Guidelines as a whole. Thus, the amendment would only state
explicitly the message the Guidelines already convey implicitly.
V. CONCLUSION
With passage of the SRA, Congress directed the Commission to implement a
system of consistent sentencing in federal court. The Commission responded by
designing the Guidelines. The Guidelines seem to strike a balance between statutory
and discretionary sentencing by confining courts to rigid ranges of sentences, but
allowing for departures if, in the sentencing court's discretion, circumstances make
a case atypical. The Commission can maintain this balance and achieve consistency
in federal sentencing only if sentencing courts exercise their discretion appropriately
and apply the law consistently. As this Note demonstrates, courts departing based on
imperfect entrapment abuse their discretion by basing departures on circumstances
supposedly unanticipated by the Commission, when, actually, the only circumstance
the Commission might not have anticipated is the misapplication of federal
entrapment doctrine by sentencing courts.
In response, the Commission should amend the Guidelines to state that, when
sentencing a convicted defendant, courts should not consider actions on the part of
government agents beyond the activities specified in section 2D 1.1, ApplicationNote
15 or beyond any behavior that fits into the language of section 5K2.12. Such an
amendment would articulate clearly the logical result of a proper application of
federal entrapment doctrine and the Koon analysis to the theory of imperfect
entrapment and would further Congress's goal of consistency in federal sentencing.
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